The Thin Red Line
To begin, let's articulate some principles: the first is war should be avoided whenever possible, the second that it should only be used in the defense of the society or as a last resort to resolve a serious issue of international concern and the third that it should not be used generally as a tool to accomplish foreign policy goals that do not meet the standards of self-defense or last resort. These three principles form the framework for the proceeding discussion.
Containment
Typically, containment, as it is conceived in U.S. policy, is ultimately an untenable endeavor. One of the rare cases in which this has not been true is Iraq. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's conventional military capabilities have been decimated, its WMD capacity at least partly dismantled and subject to international scrutiny and sanctions have reversed its economic growth. There is little support for continued sanctions due to the harmful effects the policy has brought about among the iraqi civillian population. What can be maintained is continued international scrutiny of Iraq's military capabilities and a permanent embargo against WMD materials. It is possible to achieve effective disarmament even with reluctant cooperation from the Iraqi government. Unless one believes the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno who stated that movement is impossible, the intermediate steps accomplished by weapons inspections will lead eventually to effective disarmament. A reasonable timeline of months not days or hours for disarmament and verification with accomplishable intermediate conditions would take the interminableness out of the inspections process. Thereafter, periodic inspections would examine Iraq's continued compliance and make reconstitution of WMD programs difficult and costly.
Iraq's military can be contained.
Deterrence
During the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq's WMD capacity was by any account considerably greater than it is today, Saddam Hussein refrained from using WMD against the invading coalition forces and Israel. Conventional deterrence has probably been a mainstay of international relations since the time of the powerful city states of the Mediterranean. Nuclear deterrence stabilized the tense cold war paradigm. The U.S. has the advantage of both methods of deterrence over Iraq and effectively deterred Saddam Hussein during the '91 conflict. Deterrence, especially nuclear, remains a major factor in international relations in the post-cold war world. (Consider India and Pakistan as examples). The Bush administration has argued that September 11th created a new paradigm in international affairs wherein deterrence is no longer a factor. This is clearly not the case.
9/11: The Linchpin
Considering the astonishing success of Iraqi containment and the weakness of an Iraqi military that would barely be able to summon the effort to harass its neighbors let alone attack the United States, the Bush administration has attempted to make a rhetorical link between the September 11 attack and the Iraq issue. It is true fundamentally that terrorists cannot be deterred. However, this is precisely because they are terrorists and not nations. Non-state actors are not subject to the same consequences that nation-states are subject to, therefore non-state actors operate outside the boundaries of international relations. The fact that non-state actors are now an important focus of world policymaking does not alter the international order between states. In the 12 years since Iraq has been an official enemy of the U.S, no terrorist organization has been able to acquire WMD materials. Any country that directly participates in the planning or execution of a terrorist attack against U.S. interests knows quite well what the consequences would be. This is the effect of deterrence. The idea that Al Qaeda could acquire WMD materials from Saddam Hussein (whom Osama bin Laden has called a "socialist" and "an apostate") is imaginitive, but extremely unlikely.
The administration has attempted use three individuals to build a rhetorical bridge between Al Qaeda and Iraq:
It was suggested that Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, met with an Iraqi intelligence official while in Prague. The government of the Czech Republic investigated this claim and quietly informed the Bush administration that such a meeting had never taken place.1
Abu Nidal was mentioned by the President as an Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist who was given refuge in Iraq. We know that Abu Nidal was in Iraq because he was found killed in Baghdad.2
Another allegedly Al Qaeda connected terrorist who maintains a base in Kurdish controlled northern Iraq received medical attention at a Baghdad hospital. This is supposed to be definitive proof of a relationship between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi government. None of these assertions withstands scrutiny.
The Butcher of Baghdad
There is no argument to be made against the claim that Saddam Hussein is a brutal and repressive dictator. But in this respect, he is hardly unique. If it were a matter of American policy to use military force to replace repressive governments, we would also expect war with not only Iraq or North Korea but China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, Zimbabwe and others as well. Since this is not the case, it must be asked why Iraq has been singled out for special prosecution. Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator before 1991, but when he attempted to control Kuwait's natural resources, he accidentally placed himself in the cross-hairs of U.S. foreign policy; not simply because of his regime, but because of the importance of the middle east to U.S. interests.
